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R
ECENT AFGHAN HISTORY HAS BEEN MARRED by war
crimes, transnational terrorism, drug cultivation, gender
apartheid, and draconian religious extremism. The fall of the
Taliban, however, ushered in an effort to break this tradition
of human rights violations. The Bonn Conference initiated a process
that produced the newly announced Afghan Constitution. Now, after a
decade-long spell of enduring lawlessness and anarchy, Afghan authori-
ties and critics have initiated a genuine debate over how to reconcile the
country’s history of abuse and its aspirations for a peaceful future.
The new Constitution incorporates the ideals of democracy, free-
dom, and individual rights while maintaining a strong emphasis on
Afghanistan’s Islamic heritage. Although there is no inherent conflict
between these ideals, the wording of the Constitution itself and the
current model for implementation make conflict likely. Some scholars
believe the constitutional provisions that ensure basic rights and free-
doms are expressly contradicted within the text, and that other provi-
sions could be interpreted by the current judiciary to be religiously
fundamentalist. This article presents a human rights analysis of the
new Constitution and explores potential pitfalls to its implementa-
tion.
BACKGROUND: DRAFTING THE NEW CONSTITUTION
AFTER THE DEMISE OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT in April 1992,
mujahidin guerrilla factions converged on the capital city of Kabul where
their violent collision cascaded into a full-blown civil war. By 1996,
Afghanistan was divided into two military groups: the United Front (for-
mer mujahidin), also known as the Northern Alliance, and a new group
called the Taliban, who ruled over most of the country until 2001.
In October 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks of September
11th, an international coalition led by the U.S. launched Operation
Enduring Freedom to unseat the Taliban regime, which harbored the
Al-Qaida network. On November 27, 2001, a collection of Afghan
exiles assembled in Germany for the UN-sponsored Bonn Conference
(BC). On December 5, 2001, BC participants, including representatives
of the abdicated king, Zahir Shah, and the United Front, announced a
roadmap for national reconstruction which became known as the Bonn
Agreement (BA). The BA, which combined a revision of the 1964 Con-
stitution and other laws, established a 6-month Afghan Interim Admin-
istration (AIA) under the chairmanship of Hamid Karzai. On June 9,
2002, a national gathering known as the Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ)
elected Karzai to the presidency of the Islamic Transitional State of
Afghanistan, a position he will hold until national elections take place
in June 2004. The BA also called for the creation of the Afghan Judicial
Commission (AJC), the Afghan Independent Civil Service Commission
(AICSC), the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC), and the Constitution Commission. 
On October 5, 2002, President Karzai appointed a nine-member
Constitutional Drafting Commission chaired by Vice-President
Nematullah Shahrani to produce a preliminary draft constitution. The
document was then submitted to another 30-member Constitutional
Review Commission inaugurated in March 2003 by the former king,
Zahir Shah, now symbolically called ‘Father of the Nation.’ These
efforts yielded Afghanistan's draft constitution, which was presented
to the public for review on November 3, 2003. One month later, the
draft constitution was presented to the Constitutional Loya Jirga
(CLJ) for discussion, amendment and adoption. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LOYA JIRGA
The CLJ was a national gathering of 502 delegates which includ-
ed 52 presidential appointees and 450 district representatives, elected
from some 15,000 ELJ district representatives. On the first day, the
chairman of the CLJ, a cleric, set a disappointing tone in addressing
the women delegates: “Don't try to put yourself on the same level with
men…God has not given you equal rights… two women are counted
as equal to one man.” This statement evoked memories of the Taliban’s
gender apartheid. Indeed, some 50 former Taliban officials took part
in the CLJ. Surprisingly, neither the AIHRC nor international organ-
izations challenged their presence.
A Human Rights Watch observer commented that the CLJ was
marked by the presence of alleged human rights’ violators. While mil-
itary commanders and leaders of private militias were officially barred
from becoming CLJ delegates, they made political inroads and took
leadership positions in the ten amending committees and the recon-
ciliation committee, which reviewed the decisions of the amending
committees. When an elected female delegate, Malalai Joya, spoke up
about their past atrocities and monopolization of the CLJ proceed-
ings, the chairman sought to remove her from the CLJ. Furthermore,
warlords, clerics, and their proxies used filibusters to derail the process
and further their own political goals. As a result, the CLJ lasted well
beyond the ten days originally allocated, as it was interrupted by boy-
cotts, temporary chaos, and even shelling from Taliban rebels.
Many delegates expressed dissatisfaction with the process, claim-
ing that the political climate inside the CLJ prevented them from
making their proposals and advocating for their amendments. For
example, delegates who appropriately presented more than the 151
signatures required for proposing an amendment, were threatened by
the chairmen and called “infidels” when they proposed that
Afghanistan be called the “Republic of Afghanistan” instead of the
“Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” Delegates also complained that the
amended draft of the constitution, which was ultimately adopted by
the CLJ, was different from the final draft which was signed by
President Karzai. They said that the draft had been altered and did not
reflect the findings of the ten amending committees submitted to the
reconciliation committee. Additionally, many local and international
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groups expressed their belief that the unrestricted and inviolable pro-
tection of human rights and religious freedoms was bargained away in
return for support of a strong presidential system. 
Despite these obstacles, on January 25, 2004, the new 162-article
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was signed into law
by President Karzai and is currently exists the supreme law of the land.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
THE FIRST AFGHAN CONSTITUTION was ratified in 1923 by tradi-
tional gatherings known as the Loya Jirga. Since then, Afghan history
has been punctuated by at least ten constitutional adoptions and mod-
ified adaptations, the last of which took place in 1990. The
International Crisis Group (ICG) notes, “Afghanistan’s previous
founding documents have consistently suffered from two flaws. First,
they reflected basic flaws in the underlying political architecture, flaws
that often precipitated the fall of regimes. Secondly, they invariably
failed to translate into practice.”
The new Constitution was intended to address the ills of the past
and set ambitious new goals for Afghan society. President Karzai con-
veyed this when he said, "[O]ur Constitution should not be for one or
two years, or for the benefit of few people. It should be a Constitution
forever, ensuring the rights of all." The conflicting interests that arose
during the CLJ, however, can be read in the document itself and raise
concerns that the ICG critique may also ring true for Afghanistan’s
new Constitution.
HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS
The new Afghan Constitution includes a variety of commit-
ments to internationally recognized human rights and sets up institu-
tional mechanisms to ensure their protection.
The preamble and Articles 6, 7, and 48 of the Constitution com-
mit it fully or in part to respecting the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), assuring a wide range of civil, political, economic,
social, and cultural rights. Articles 29 and 49 prohibit forced labor, tor-
ture, and other inhumane punishments, while Articles 52 and 43 assure
free health care and education respectively. Under Article 7, “the state
shall abide by the UN Charter, international treaties and international
human rights conventions that Afghanistan has signed and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.” Since Afghanistan is a signatory to the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), there is an implicit prohibition on sex
discrimination in both public and private sectors of society.
In addition, Articles 62, 72, 85, and 118 prohibit the election or
appointment of a president, vice-presidents, ministers, national assem-
bly members, or Supreme Court justices who have been convicted of
crimes against humanity. 
According to Article 58, any person whose fundamental rights
have been violated can file a complaint with the AIHRC, which can
refer cases to legal authorities and assist in defending the rights of the
victim. Article 134 requires the police to discover crimes and the
Attorney’s Office to investigate and prosecute them.
Though there appears to be strong de jure support for human
rights, the concern is that conflicting provisions and their interpreta-
tions will limit the de facto realization of such rights.
RELIGION AND THE STATE
The basis for constitutional law in Afghanistan is a combination
of civil law and Islamic beliefs, provisions, and principles. However,  as
the state religion, Islam plays a major role in guiding all things from
education to political parties to judicial interpretation. 
Article 2 of the Constitution establishes Islam as the state reli-
gion. Article 3 states “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provi-
sions of the sacred religion of Islam,” and Article 35 requires that the
platform and charter of political parties be consistent with the princi-
ples of Islam. Article 45 declares that educational curricula must be, in
part, based on the provisions of Islam. In addition, Article 54 calls for
the elimination of all traditions conflicting with Islamic principles.
Articles 19 and 20 ensure that even the national flag and anthem
incorporate Islamic wording and symbols. Additionally, Article 149
explicitly states “the provisions of adherence to the fundamentals of
the sacred religion of Islam and the regime of the Islamic Republic
cannot be amended.” 
Articles 130 and 131 call for the development of Sunni and Shi’a
Islamic jurisprudence in the absence of existing laws or cases dealing
with personal status, and nothing in the Constitution prevents the
implementation of Sharia, or Islamic law. Of particular concern is the
failure to define legal parameters for how “the beliefs and provisions of
Islam” should be construed. Since a unified, codified Islamic law does
not exist, Islamic interpretation will surely become common within
the judiciary. Indeed, Article 121 gives the Supreme Court power to
review laws, legislative decrees, international treaties, and internation-
al conventions, and interpret them, in compliance with the
Constitution. Given the sweeping provisions of Article 3, the Supreme
Court could reject any law or treaty arguing that it violates Article 3
and bring charges of blasphemy or apostasy. 
The subjective application of the aforementioned constitutional
provisions has clear implications for the protection and promotion of
human rights. There is currently no mechanism, other than the inter-
pretive power given to the Supreme Court, to resolve the built-in con-
flicts and apparent contradictions between the human rights provi-
sions of the Constitution and the clauses asserting Islam as the state
religion and supreme law of the land. Given the current fundamental-
ist tendencies of the Supreme Court, it is not far fetched that a de jure
theocratic state could take shape in the future.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, MINORITY RIGHTS
AND DISCRIMINATION
While most Afghans belong to either the Sunni Muslim majori-
ty or Shi’a Muslim minority, the Constitution does not guarantee
Muslims or non-Muslims the right to dissent with Islamic beliefs or
interpretations. Furthermore, there is no explicit declaration of equal-
ity between religions; indeed, Article 2 states that “[t]ollowers of other
religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites
within the limits of the provisions of the law (emphasis added).” Such
“limits and provisions” could be construed as sanctioning
discrimination. It also offers very little security to non-Muslims in the
legal framework described above. Article 3 talks only about respect for
Islam and does not mention other religions. 
While Hindu and Sikh Afghans are native inhabitants of
Afghanistan, today they represent a very small minority. During the last
decade the Hindu and Sikh communities suffered at the hands of reli-
gious fundamentalists. This sad history is reflected in the new
Constitution, which implicitly discriminates against Hindus and Sikhs.
Article 62 stipulates that any head of state must be Muslim. The oath
of allegiance to God and Islam taken by the president, vice-presidents,
ministers, and Supreme Court justices has clear marginalizing effects.
In addition, Articles 72 and 118 require potential ministers and
Supreme Court justices to have a “good reputation.” As there are no
criteria for determining what is a “good reputation,” this normative
statement can be used as a discriminatory legal tool against anyone
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whose political or religious views are disfavored by the establishment.
Furthermore, Article 17 mentions state responsibility for improve-
ments to mosques and religious schools and centers, while Hindu and
Sikh temples are not mentioned. As noted above, Articles 35 says that
the platforms or ideologies of political parties cannot conflict with the
principles of Islam, but theoretically may offend the Hindu or Sikh
faiths. In addition, Article 54 may be used to curtail Hindu and Sikh
traditions under the allegation of being contrary to Islam.
The state-sanctioned discrimination that runs throughout the
new Constitution clearly contradicts the commitment to human
rights and equal participation included in other provisions of the
Constitution. The manner in which the State implements the new
Constitution will determine which principles will prevail. A look at
the judiciary, the main vehicle for implementation, raises genuine con-
cerns about the potential for human rights abuses.
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND CRISIS
CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN pose significant
challenges to the Constitution’s implementation. Much of rural
Afghanistan remains under the control of Taliban rebels and warlords-
turned-governors, who continue to threaten, steal, rape, restrict
women and children’s rights, and occasionally kill locals, political
opponents, rival commanders, and humanitarian workers. Even in
Kabul, relatively the safest city in the country, law enforcement offi-
cials sometimes seize land or other property, arbitrarily arrest and
detain citizens, and beat or mistreat detainees.
As mentioned above, the AIHRC cannot prosecute war criminals
or human rights’ violators but must refer them to the court. This means
that the implementation of the human rights standards enshrined in
the new Constitution will fall to the judiciary. The current judiciary is
notoriously unrepresentative of the broad spectrum of views in
Afghanistan. Trial court judges lack commitment to human rights prin-
ciples, a problem that is exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s custom of
deciding appeals without hearing arguments. The U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom stated in a November 2003 report
that the current Supreme Court Chief Justice, Fazl Hadi Shinwari
“rejects three crucial freedoms–expression, religion, and equality of
sexes–all of which are international standards protected by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Together, the Supreme
Court and the Ministry of Justice have restricted the freedom of the
press; ordered the execution of two journalists for blasphemy; charged
a sitting minister with blasphemy; refused to register a political party;
banned cable, coeducation, and female music videos; and proposed the
revocation of an expatriate beauty pageant contestant’s citizenship.
The new Constitution envisions the judicial branch as an inde-
pendent organ of the government consisting of High Courts, Appeals
Courts, and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court will consist of
nine members appointed by the President for a period of ten years
with the approval of the legislature. In order to ensure rotating terms
of office, the proposed appointment process calls for three members to
be appointed for a period of four years, three members for seven years,
and three members for ten years. Later appointments will be for a peri-
od of ten years. A member of the Supreme Court must have a higher
education in law or in Islamic jurisprudence, and sufficient expertise
and experience in the judicial system of Afghanistan. The members are
not permitted to be appointed for a second term and, under Article
127, can only be dismissed from their service before their term ends
by a vote of one of the houses of parliament “due to a crime commit-
ted during the performance of duty.”
Although the model is sound, many believe that with Supreme
Court justices like the current ones, it is not a question of structure,
but rather a problem of substance. As the Supreme Court asserts the
powers granted it by the Constitution, becomes financially viable, and
gains legitimacy, anxiety about a potential increase in restrictions on
freedoms will likely be validated. The Supreme Court has already
expanded from 9 to 137 justices, and created a Religious Edict
Council that has the potential to manipulate the National Assembly,
the President, political parties, academic freedom, and the rest of civil
society under the pretext of upholding the provisions of Islam accord-
ing to Article 3. The concern is that this course of events will spark a
constitutional crisis and further polarize an already fragmented gov-
ernment and society. 
The potential for the Supreme Court to abuse its constitutional
mandate was witnessed only days after the adoption of the new
Constitution, when the Court clashed with the Ministry of Information
and Culture (MIC) over the broadcast of old footage of a famous
Afghan woman singing patriotic songs on television. Although the
footage violated a ban on female singers imposed earlier by the Supreme
Court, the MIC cited that men and women were equal in the eye of the
new Constitution’s Article 2 and therefore justified the broadcast. The
Supreme Court reacted by reasserting its ban on female singers. Not sur-
prisingly, the Governor of Herat banned local female singers and warned
the MIC against violating religious law by broadcasting female singers
again. Immediately, the Supreme Court applauded the Governor’s defi-
ance of the MIC, while the MIC publicly criticized the Supreme Court
decision. This potential clash between government entities is a constitu-
tional crisis that Afghanistan cannot endure.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THE INVOLVEMENT OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS and warlords
alleged to have had a hand in crimes against humanity transformed the
entire process and outcomes of the BC, the ELJ, and the CLJ. Now,
those same actors are threatening the fairness of the upcoming elec-
tions in Afghanistan by intimidating voters from registration, violat-
ing human rights, and swaying political preferences in an effort to
hijack the legislature.
Despite the many improvements in Afghanistan since the fall of the
Taliban, such as the restoration of some democratic institutions, the par-
tial lifting of press censorship, and the signing of several international
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human rights instruments, there remains much ignorance and resistance
to human rights from within the central and provincial government.
Unfortunately, the international community and the UN have
been generally ineffective in promoting human rights in Afghanistan.
The UN has been non-committal because its main agency, United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), wants to
maintain a “light footprint” presence in Afghanistan. The internation-
al coalition, supplying security forces or reconstruction funds, has
failed to take a pro-active role in addressing human rights issues. This
policy of neutral disengagement must be reversed. 
The international coalition should take an active role in persuad-
ing Afghan governmental institutions to implement the human rights
provisions of the Constitution and to respect human rights principles
and promote them throughout the governmental system. Improving
human rights is not merely about disbanding and disarming private
militias, but also must include a program to replace them with police,
military, and other state officials who are sensitized to human rights.
Furthermore, it is within the criminal justice system where the Afghan
government’s real-life commitment to the implementation and princi-
ples of human rights and signed international treaties will be challenged. 
There must be improvements within the legal system, where reli-
gious conservatives have packed the Supreme Court and Ministry of
Justice. The current Supreme Court must be disbanded. New judge
appointees must pledge to uphold the human rights principles and
international treaties enshrined in the Constitution, such as those guid-
ing the UDHR and CEDAW. Furthermore, the Supreme Court should
only issue rulings after properly hearing cases and should implement
the human rights provisions of the Constitution without caving in to
conservative interpretations that would gut the letter and spirit of the
Constitution’s attempt to balance religion and human rights. 
Progressive reforms can be made vis-à-vis the AJC, whose mis-
sion is to rebuild the justice system, and the AICSC, which is charged
with ensuring competence and ethical standards for government offi-
cials and employees. The AIHRC needs more power and resources
delegated to it in order to bring the violators of human rights to jus-
tice. The immediate expansion of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) outside of Kabul and those territories where defiant war-
lords rule still must occur. The UN human rights monitors must be
deployed throughout the country to assist the AIHRC and also to ful-
fill its UN chartered duty to document human rights violations.
While a reconciliation of Islam and human rights can be
achieved in theory, there exists very real political divisions in
Afghanistan, which challenge the Constitution’s practical implemen-
tation. If hopes for the respect of human rights are raised but later
crushed, then the result will be resentment, polarization, extremism,
and instability in an already distraught country. Although no one
expects an overnight solution, when the chief architects of alleged war
crimes carry out constitutional implementation and justice, concerns
for the country’s future must be considered seriously. If human rights
are not realized, then the notion of a democratized Afghanistan will
remain an illusion. Only time will tell whether this Constitution will
be the basis for democracy, which many Afghan citizens desire, or just
another obsolete document full of unrealized promises.  HRB
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